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Abstract. The explication of the Christian hope of resurrection requires 
Christianity to spell out the way in which God actually deals in the world. Only 
if we succeed, with regard to past, present, and future, in making the talk of 
God’s special action in history plausible, are we able to reasonably assert essential 
Christian beliefs. Yet due to past horrors, present ongoing suffering, and a future 
that promises of little else, it is precisely this talk that has become doubtful. This 
article tries to describe God’s action as a process enabling freedom and love in 
order to develop a theodicy-sensitive speech about God’s action.
I. EXPOSITION OF THE PROBLEM
The writer Elie Wiesel tells the story of a small group of Jews who were 
gathered to pray in a little synagogue in Nazi-occupied Europe. As the 
service went on, suddenly a  pious Jew who was slightly mad  – for all 
pious Jews were by then slightly mad – burst in through the door. Silently 
he listened for a moment as the prayers ascended. Slowly he said: ‘Shh, 
Jews! Do not pray so loud! God will hear you. Then He will know that 
there are still some Jews left alive in Europe.’ (Fackenheim 1970a: 67)
What becomes clear in this narrative written by Jewish Auschwitz-
survivor Elie Wiesel is how much the National-Socialist mass murder of 
Jews has challenged the belief in YHWH’s ability to powerfully intervene 
in history. The Bible testifies to a  God who has repeatedly intervened 
to save his people. Yet this narrative portrays him as an all-devouring 
demon. If one doesn’t want to accept the claim that God’s character has 
changed, the only solution seems to be to infer that God has obviously lost 
his power and can now only impotently observe evil from the sidelines.
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Due to metaphysical developments arguing that God is more limited 
than traditionally construed this option is admittedly somewhat popular 
in the contemporary theological and philosophy-of-religion debate. 
However, this proposal would demand nothing less than that the main 
strand of Jewish and Christian tradition abandon its identity. For the 
experience of God’s action in history is not only the root of Jewish 
identity and Israel’s testimony of faith; it is also a fundamental feature of 
Christian belief.
Thus if increasingly many people struggle to conceive of God as acting 
in history, and if this approach has indeed been ‘wholly lost, the God 
of history is Himself lost’ (Fackenheim 1970a: 79). Hence the question 
arises how traditional Jewish and Christian belief can still be defended 
at all.
Despite the uniqueness of its horror, the National-Socialist mass 
murder is but one among many testimonies against God’s action in 
history. For Christian belief, since this atrocity was directed against the 
very people whose testimony upholds Christians’ traditional belief in 
God’s historical action, these unutterable horrors thus threaten belief 
in the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who, according to Christian 
testimony, has revealed himself in Jesus Christ as God for all people, 
today as much as 70 years ago. Historical-critical exegesis of the Bible 
indicates that, according to Biblical testimony, it is only in retrospect that 
people understand the ways in which God has dealt with them.
Accompanied by one’s grateful memory of God’s salvation, it is 
exactly this view that Auschwitz calls into question. How is it possible 
to give thanks to God for a  full life and his guidance, if innumerable 
people have, for no reason, been butchered? How to rely on the power 
of intercession, if so many screams have gone unanswered? Can I still 
thank God for his signs of love and faithfulness in my life, if innumerable 
people have waited for these signs in vain? May I  still give praise to 
God’s providence and power in history, if this power has done nothing 
to stop the million-fold murder of innocent children, or if the belief 
in providence has, because of its abuse in the form of ideologies, been 
widely discredited?
Caused by Auschwitz, questions of this sort are not only unavoidable 
for Jewish reflection on faith, but almost even more for Christians. 
Since the history of horrors and suffering did not stop after the Nazis 
but has occurred recently – remember the unimaginable cruelties of the 
Rwandan Genocide of 1994 – it is therefore understandable, that, in both 
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Jewish and Christian reflection on belief, the confession of God as the 
loving and powerful guide of history, and the strong leader of his people 
out of Egypt, rebels against utterance. History as a place of encounter 
with God has become questionable. What becomes even stronger in the 
face of these horrors, however, is the yearning for this God and his justice. 
Believers, therefore, increasingly turn from gratefully remembering 
God’s action in history to deeply longing for it.
With belief reduced to this experience, it makes sense to ask what can 
ground this hope, if there is so little evidence of God’s presence today. On 
which powerful signs, that can still be experienced today, can the belief in 
God as someone who directs history, be based? Neglecting this question 
threatens to expose religious belief to the suspicion of being based on 
unfounded hopes, offering insight only into what human beings long 
for. Yet it is deeply unsatisfying to assume without further inquiry that 
God is active today. Accordingly, the boom enjoyed by the talk of God’s 
action in evangelical groups and mainline charismatic movements is 
an increasing irritant, as this talk ignores all of the challenges bequeathed 
by the modern era. Apparently, in searching for comfort, more and more 
people are turning a blind eye to the horrific challenges of claims to God’s 
action, and in suppressing critical inquiries they surrender themselves to 
the desire for his presence.
Admittedly, such naive talk of the presence of God and his action is 
understandable in light of its ability to bring relief. But in the light of the 
history of suffering it has lost its innocence. Since the aforementioned 
questions can no longer be put aside (if they ever could), the 
abovementioned questions make it indispensable for any theology which 
asserts God’s action in history to be sensitive to the question of theodicy.
From what has been said so far, it should have become clear that the 
explication of the Christian hope of resurrection requires Christianity to 
spell out the way in which God actually deals in the world. Only if we 
succeed, with regard to past, present, and future, in making the talk of 
God’s special action in history plausible, we are able to reasonably assert 
essential Christian beliefs. Yet due to past horrors, present ongoing 
suffering, and a future that promises of little else, it is precisely this talk 
that has become doubtful. As the talk of God’s action in the world is 
indispensable for the Christian message, the all important question for 
me is therefore whether it can be developed side by side with concern for 
worldly suffering.
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II. GOD’S ACTION AS A PROCESS ENABLING FREEDOM AND LOVE
The standard solution of contemporary Christian theology consists 
in defining God’s action from the viewpoint of love and tracing the 
horrors of history back to human abuse of freedom. The background 
of this thought is formed by the idea that the relationship between God 
and man is understood as dialogical and free. In this relationship, it is 
imagined, God tries to win man’s love by means of love alone. From this 
perspective, God’s ultimate goal of creation and the focus of his action 
consist in his intention to win ‘co-lovers’. This relationship is not based 
on any achievements of the creature or needs of the creator, but forms 
an end in itself. It is based on nothing other than in the free and original 
decision to enable freedom for others. Accordingly, God’s act of creation 
is already spelled out in terms of acting out of freedom and creating out 
of nothing.
Their connexion [of creator and creature; K.v.S.] is not conditioned by 
anything except freedom, which means that it is unconditioned. Hence 
every use of a causal category for understanding the act of creation is 
ruled out. Creator and creature cannot be said to have a relation of cause 
and effect, for between Creator and creature there is neither a  law of 
motive nor a law of effect nor anything else. (Bonhoeffer 1959: 31)
If God’s relationship to his creation is imagined as free and thus unable 
to be understood in terms of causal yet personal categories, it must – as 
Bonhoeffer goes on to explain – be based on creation out of nothing. 
Moreover, creation out of nothing is to be imagined as the creator’s free 
self-limitation and as a reproduction of the inter-Trinitarian relationship 
of love. Just as it is the essential characteristic of love ‘that the loving 
person limits her- or himself on behalf of the beloved’ (Jüngel 1990b: 
154, my translation), God enables the freedom of his creation by limiting 
himself and creating the world as an end in itself.
God, in every moment of history, must be thought of as the 
foundation enabling natural evolution and freedom (creatio continua). 
With his work of creation based in nothing but uncaused love, God 
makes possible a  relationship of free and mutual recognition with his 
creatures, remaining radically true to it in every moment of history.
The radical nature of this faithfulness and the seriousness of God’s 
invitation to love can be seen in the fact that God uncompromisingly and 
exclusively uses love to win man over. Indeed, God tries to win mankind 
over even when they strongly deny his goodness:
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God wouldn’t be truly serious in his relationship with humankind if he 
didn’t endorse it uncompromisingly; if he, so to speak, had other means 
than love up his sleeve to exercise his power over humankind. God really 
banks on the power of love and he does not make recourse to other 
means. (Werbick 1985: 114, my translation)
On this view (which is centrally anchored in Christian tradition), the 
freedom to love is thus the fundamental goal of God’s creation. God’s 
most important intention, which can therefore help to identify his 
action, is to promise (himself as) love to mankind, with this promise 
taking fundamental shape in the action of Jesus. Thus God’s intention is 
realized all the more when people act out of love. Yet love is only itself, 
if it is not manipulated by others, and can by definition only be based on 
an independent decision. Therefore, if God’s intention is to enable love to 
set mankind free, and if love is only possible if free, then God can realize 
his intention in this world only. That is, he must act by setting mankind 
free and showing them love, without manipulating them into loving him 
but rather just affirming and encouraging it.
From this perspective, God’s will is realized, if human beings, in their 
words and actions, ‘mutually attribute the meaning of their being to each 
other by making each other aware of their freedom and by affirming and 
recognizing each other in freedom, i.e. by loving each other’ (Pröpper 
2001: 238, my translation). And on this view, held among others by 
Thomas Pröpper, the most radical event of God’s special action in the 
world – which the Christian tradition regards as miraculous – can be 
nothing other than the realization of God’s intention that we freely 
recognize each other and him.
At this point, it is crucially important not to define divine and human 
action as being in competition. Otherwise one would always have to ask 
how divine action can be operative at all if free agents decide in favour 
of one another. The point of the foregoing, rather, is that, with regard 
to events in the world, divine and human freedom are directly  – not 
inversely  – proportional. The more a  human being realizes her or his 
freedom, the more God acts in her or him, and the more the intention of 
divine freedom becomes true through his or her action. If a human being 
loves, God acts through her or him.
‘Love comes from God’ (1 John 4:7), and: ‘Ubi caritas, ibi deus est – et agit.’ 
Wherever human beings are enabled to do what they do not naturally 
tend to do – i.e., overcoming their egotism – and to surpass themselves 
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so as to become human beings for others, God is acting through human 
beings. (Kessler 2002: 290, my translation)
The underlying idea of this personal-action theory must not be 
misunderstood. It does not claim that individuals are unfree. It claims 
rather that the innermost possibility of free self-determination is 
ultimately made possible by God’s action. The highest dimension of 
human autonomy is, in its very autonomy, willed and supported by God. 
Thus the more I change the world in an attitude of love, the more God’s 
intention with his creation becomes reality. But how can my freedom 
and autonomy grow by God’s action? Is not my freedom rather restricted 
by God’s giving a new direction to my life?
III. GOD’S ACTION AS ENABLING NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR LIFE
I believe that an insight of Jürgen Werbick’s can help us see things more 
clearly. In defining the notion of God’s omnipotence, he ascribes to God 
the power ‘to overcome the lack of alternatives in times of natural and 
quasi-natural inevitabilities’ and, in this way, to call upon human beings 
to use their freedom. (Werbick 2004: 109, my translation) Werbick adds:
To enable freedom means to offer opportunities (S. Kierkegaard) and to 
offer real opportunities, to the extent of generating a practicable vision 
for the future that can, against mere necessity, really be chosen. (Werbick 
2004: 110, my translation)
God’s action as enabling freedom can thus be understood as God pointing 
out to us new opportunities for living and new alternatives for behaving. 
Since men and women are not forced to choose the new alternative, God’s 
action preserves his or her complete autonomy. The choice is completely 
left to her or him. Yet God can try to woo man, to call upon him, and 
to attract him, by offering and granting new life opportunities. Precisely 
in his perpetual enabling of different perspectives and possibilities of 
rescue from impasses, God can therefore realize his freedom without 
reducing human freedom but rather increasing it. From this perspective, 
God’s calling to us can be discovered in all conditions of life, offering to 
integrate us into his plan in a way appropriate to us. J. R. Lucas illustrates 
this thought, as suggested by Brümmer, by pointing to the allegory of 
a Persian carpet maker who, together with his children, manufactures 
a carpet. ‘In his wisdom and sovereignty the father manages to integrate 
all of his children’s mistakes into the emerging pattern, by continually 
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revising the way in which he envisions the final product, thus creating 
a  perfect design.  – God acts in a  dialogical and responsive way.’ 
(Bernhardt 1999: 156, my translation) Thus from this perspective, God 
cannot determine his creatures’ decisions, but he can motivate and 
inspire them to do his will.
In this Trinitarian way, however, God’s agency is not coercive but enabling 
and motivating and therefore does not deny freedom, responsibility, or 
personal integrity of the human agent through whose action God realizes 
his will. On the contrary, it is still up to us as human agents to do God’s 
will, and if we decide not to (in spite of being enlightened, enabled, and 
motivated) then God’s will is not done. (Brümmer 2008: 75f.)
God could therefore be understood as the author of a novel, designing 
a  good overall story from the personalities and behaviours of his 
characters.
It is by inspiring them with his will that God lays claim to the will 
and the action of human beings, but it remains up to the individual to 
cooperate with God or not. The effectiveness of God’s action and the 
freedom of the creaturely actors are also combined in the thinking 
of Austin Farrer. Very much in the sense outlined above of a  direct 
proportional relationship between divine and human freedom, Farrer 
even assumes that human freedom is strengthened by God’s influence.
Assuming a  relationship of this kind implies, of course, the basic 
assumption of relational theism saying that the belief that God wants 
to have a relationship with us and that he has therefore freely decided 
to make some of his actions contingent on our needs and actions. 
According to this conception, there is something like a  freely chosen 
contingency in God. God does not get everything he wants. However, he 
can always try to realize his intention; he might for instance try to win 
the free individual by acting through other human beings, or by pointing 
to new possibilities for life.
Thus, God influences history through his word and his spirit, but with 
very flexible plans which always respect the freedom of the individual. 
Man’s free decision to use his abilities and to take control obviously 
seems to be meaningful to God himself; he does not ignore or force this 
decision; he tries to win man over for and to ask for it. (Greshake 1997: 
302, my translation)
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In the light of the considerations advanced so far, there now seem to 
be two possibilities for defining the relationship between divine and 
human action. According to the first, there is a strict identity between 
divine and human action. In this case, the autonomy of creaturely 
action is maintained, so long as the relationship is conceived as God 
acting through human actors. In this sense, I believe, we can understand 
Werbick’s aforementioned idea as God’s acting where his will is done.
The second possibility construes God’s action in pointing out new 
alternatives to man as being mediated differently. Rather than being 
identical, human and divine action are dialogically related. The idea 
is that human action can be understood as response to the divine 
demonstration of different opportunities for life. We might also appeal 
to Trinitarian theology to try to define and to substantiate both ways of 
action more precisely. In the sense of strict identity, we might conceive 
of God’s action through human actors as mediated through God’s 
self-manifestation in the logos. Moreover, we might conceive of God’s 
dialogical action in offering new opportunities for life as mediated 
through God’s self-manifestation in the Spirit.
The liberating impact of the Spirit can therefore always be perceived 
by those who cease to feel coerced, controlled by circumstances, and 
who begin to choose their way for themselves. As long as we no longer 
allow ourselves to be controlled by borders and compulsions, and as long 
as we stand up against the exploitation of people for whatever means, we 
can perceive the Spirit. It becomes reality so long as we do not surrender 
to the hustle and bustle of everyday life, but consciously live according 
to our own convictions and thus enable community with another being. 
One could therefore say that the Spirit’s action cannot be realized without 
the concrete performance of freedom  – already enabled by that same 
Spirit – which is what positions one in a dialogical and free relationship.
What is meant here, can, in a limited way, already be experienced in 
love. Lovers, by performing acts of love and commitment and by living 
through and for the other person, experience freedom and a new form 
of being oneself. Love makes the requirements of everyday life seem less 
important. Habits and circumstances lose the power to shape one’s life 
and all of life’s performances are influenced by the image of the other 
person. In this way new opportunities for life and new beginnings 
emerge. In this way ‘lovers are, at least a  little bit and maybe only for 
a  certain time, endowed with independence from other requirements 
and from the “obsessions” of everyday life, as a future is opened up to 
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them which offers much brighter prospects than those which could be 
provided and secured through cunning calculation’.
It is exactly this experience of liberation through love that shows how 
close the connection is between the freedom worked by the Spirit and the 
experience of love. Just as freedom is the condition of possibility of love, 
freedom is actually carried and made possible by love. Yet in the light 
of the darknesses of history, one can still ask how it is possible to speak 
this affirmatively of love and freedom. How can God’s power in history 
be spoken of in this way by someone who is sensitive to the history of 
suffering of this world?
IV. CRITERIA FOR THEODICY-SENSITIVE SPEECH 
ABOUT GOD’S ACTION
First of all, it is important that our speech concerning divine action contain 
vulnerability and moments of irritation and uncertainty. Yet from the 
perspective of practical reason, this vulnerability and uncertainty is not 
justified, but is based on the ongoing impossibility of become reconciled 
with God’s creation. As long as human beings are tortured to death or 
perish miserably in floods, theology of history cannot resist bafflement 
or irritation. Therefore, we must not try to protect our beliefs in God by 
aiming for an unshakable foundation, but must speak in a sensitive way 
that takes into account our place in history.
Moreover, we must neither identify the course of history with God’s 
good will, nor try to mask outrageous injustice and suffering that is simply 
not supposed to be happening. Divine action must rather be understood 
in such a way that it cannot be identified with the history of the winners. 
Like W. Benjamin’s notion of the ‘angel of history’ (Benjamin 2003: 
392), God’s action, in its ‘power of powerlessness’, has to be conceived 
as an  attempt to put an  end to mankind’s criminal delusions. It must 
be imagined as wanting to enable new beginnings even after the most 
disastrous effects of natural laws. As the angel, God does not look away 
from the ruins of history, instead remaining to put back together what 
has been smashed. Yet his efforts are repeatedly ruined by mankind’s 
delusionary belief in the progress of history and men’s abuse of freedom 
related to it. The image of the angel of history portrays God as a lasting 
authority who can be called upon to act against the wrongdoings and 
catastrophes of history, even if this means to do what Job does: to call on 
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God against God. Even though we are faced with a horrendous history 
tolerated by God, the only possible saving authority is God himself.
The tension of calling on God against God cannot, of course, 
be maintained endlessly. On the contrary, we must be able to enjoy 
confidence that God will ultimately in his all-embracing goodness and 
mercy bring true salvation and justice. Yet history constantly frustrates 
this confidence, leaving us to express it as eschatological unrest. For only 
by God’s bringing an end to history can we hope that his goodwill will be 
realized everywhere – for in this case it will be the only remaining power 
able to shape reality. Only then can we hope that God in his holy power 
will make his presence felt in all things.
The abovementioned eschatological hope is based on God’s self-
revelation in the suffering and death of Jesus Christ. The belief in Jesus’ 
resurrection can, moreover, help make it clear that God’s saving will can 
even persevere in the most hopeless of situations. Yet looking at the cross 
reminds us that there is no certainty that God’s will will be done in the 
world, because (as we have seen) he limits himself to the means of love. 
It reminds us that his Good News too often seems to be frustrated by the 
factual course of history. Moreover, looking at the ceaseless repetition of 
human suffering as unbearable as that of the cross forbids theology from 
speaking confidently of victory. Because the fullness of God’s presence 
has not yet arrived, theological speech must continually be cognizant of 
the abovementioned eschatological tension.
Faced with the monstrous extent of human guilt, theological speech, 
must also avoid spelling out God’s goodness and mercy without including 
mention of his justice. We must not demand God’s all-embracing and 
saving closeness without also demanding that he enforces justice. 
Otherwise it would be impossible to communicate God’s will to save 
everyone to a  concentration-camp survivor. At this point, Christian 
thinkers and pastors, who sometimes speak carelessly of reconciliation 
and love, have a good deal to learn from the emphasis placed by Jewish 
theology on God’s justice.
Yet theology will continue to insist, in the tradition of Paul and 
Luther, on spelling out God’s justice as ‘making righteous’; it will thus 
become clear that no amount of guilt can put an  end either to God’s 
will for reconciliation or to his willingness to love. Yet faced with the 
severity and the incomprehensibility of the guilt, one can only warn of 
thinking divine reconciliation through to the end in an all-too-human 
way without any irritation. Instead of working out a  theory of final 
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reconciliation in terms of the doctrine of apocatastasis, we must try to 
maintain the tension between the demand for justice and the hope of 
reconciliation. Only in God’s incomprehensibility, which can only be 
explicated as limit-concept, can the possibility be maintained that God’s 
love, making just without also dissolving justice, can even seek and be 
reconciled to the worst of criminals.
Moreover, in this context it is important to consider (as we have seen 
in history) that we cannot have reconciliation without also remembering 
injustice. Therefore, another feature of a theodicy-sensitive theology is 
its anamnetic outline. For not only is the core of Christian belief formed 
by the remembrance of the passion of Jesus Christ, but the history of the 
people of Israel, which is so crucial for Christian belief, is characterized 
by a  horrifying history of suffering combined with the Israelites’ 
unparalleled willingness to remember it. Therefore God’s action cannot 
simply ignore past suffering. Accordingly, a  theodicy-sensitive talk of 
God must – non-negotiably – contain the hope that a history of suffering 
can be inwardly transformed, making it possible to affirm life without 
turning a blind eye to one’s own suffering or that of others. Moreover, 
by holding fast to the hope of God’s transforming power, we must not 
forget the sufferings of others and must expect transformation and new 
creation for everyone.
Thus apart from remembering and recognizing our own suffering, 
it cannot be overemphasized that we must do likewise – and even more 
so  – with regard to the sufferings of others, and indeed even of our 
enemies. Thus understood, God’s action in making one aware of reality 
would always imply a sharpening of our perception of its painful aspects. 
Instead of perceiving only reality’s pleasant facets, we must perceive its 
ambivalent entirety. This means being attentive to the perspective of the 
underdogs and the unfortunate.
Sensitivity to theodicy thus always also means sensitivity to suffering 
as an  indelible part of reality. Only the perception of another person’s 
suffering enables me to see reality fully. If appreciation of reality is meant 
to be the basic motivation for human beings as well as the basic challenge 
for human reason, then it is precisely here where an important moment 
of theodicy-sensitive action of God can be found which has to be 
explicated. In this context we can notice that it is not only the Christian 
tradition in which sensitivity to reality, in particular to the sufferings 
of others, promotes spiritual perfection and encounter with ultimate 
reality. However, if awareness of the history of another’s suffering, and 
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appreciation of reality in its entirety, are regarded as moments of divine 
action, they cannot be conceived of without a  total respect for the 
dignity of the suffering person. What follows from this insight is that we 
must never speak of God’s action in the world in a way that loses from 
view the dignity of the individual with her or his history of suffering. 
For we misunderstand the Jewish and Christian God if we fail to grasp 
that his action calls upon us to appreciate every other individual and 
that he never considers human beings as a means but rather as an end 
in themselves. Since, if in the logic of the deuteronomistic theology of 
history, Israel’s opponents are regarded as ‘instruments of God’ and are 
therefore reduced to mere means in the divine plan of salvation, they 
cannot be appreciated by God as persons. They turn from subjects to mere 
instruments of divine action as they realize their devastating intentions 
and thus forfeit their own dignity. In the context of the deuteronomistic 
theology of history, when they fulfil God’s plan to punish Israel, they do 
serve a purpose intended by YHWH in calling Israel to turn back to him 
from their sins. Yet this action does not provide Israel’s opponents with 
any value, and the biblical testimonies are compatible with the insight 
that, although these people degrade themselves to mere means in this 
context, God will also call them in their dignity to be enactors of his will 
elsewhere.
Apparently, however, God has categorically decided himself not to 
implement his goodwill without his creatures’ participation. And it is 
exactly in this decision in which the highest appreciation of man by God 
can be found. For man has not only been created as an object of God’s 
love entitled to love him back, but has been empowered to encourage 
others with the love of God and to therefore himself give shape to the 
reality of God’s action. Only in acknowledging God’s action in inviting 
man to participate in the appreciation of reality and to fight gratuitous 
suffering is a  theodicy-sensitive speech of God’s action in the world 
possible. A final criterion of any theodicy-sensitive talk of God’s action 
in the world finally is that it must be introduced into a  practice that 
anticipatorily makes present what is eschatologically expected from God: 
to comfort all who mourn, to cure the sick, to encourage the frightened, 
to overcome injustice and to establish a community that, in reconciled 
diversity, excludes nobody. We must talk of God as someone who, here 
and now, rescues us from bondage, who will lead one through the desert 
to her or his promised land. To do this we must oppose any form of 
human enslavement, refresh the hungry and thirsty in the deserts of 
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life, and open up life-perspectives for others which recognize them even 
when they differ from us.
We can summarize the criteria as follows: Theodicy-sensitive talk of 
God’s action must
 – remain vulnerable (by referring to history) and react with 
uncertainty and shock to suffering
 – have an  anamnetic outline and, when turning towards God and 
speaking of his promises, be unwilling to forget the past sufferings 
of the world
 – be mindful of the whole reality, describing God’s action as 
sharpening our perception for the painful aspects of reality. 
A crucial aspect to be sensitive to, here, is to recognize the dignity 
of the suffering person
 – It must be conceived as resistance and protest against outrageous 
injustice and take seriously that the claim that man has been 
appreciated and empowered by God to participate in transforming 
the world by the power of divine love
 – It must be characterized by eschatological unrest, and must point 
towards the final implementation of God’s goodness and justice, 
while also trying to make it present here and now.
We have yet to see whether these criteria can be sustained in the face of 
the ultimate challenge to God’s action in the world: the barbaric mass 
murder of Jews during National Socialist rule in Germany. For not only 
must our criteria reject clearly cynical claims concerning God’s action in 
the concentration camps, it must sustain the possibility of talking about 
an exceptional action of God’s even in the harshest catastrophe. Only if 
both conditions are met can the criteria be considered justified and can 
we accept them as basic coordinates for speaking of God’s action in the 
world.
V. AUSCHWITZ AS A TEST FOR 
THE CRITERIOLOGY DEVELOPED ABOVE
In the light of Auschwitz, the attempt to offer a comprehensive theory 
would, of course, be misguided from the outset. Thus the following 
intends merely to collect a few examples of theological speech of divine 
action in the interest of ascertaining whether the criteria compiled above 
are appropriate.
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A first example of an attempt to talk about God’s action in Auschwitz 
is that of an  inmate thanking God for sparing him during the daily 
‘selections’. Each day the Nazis selected and killed those who were no 
longer capable of hard labour. In this situation, a behaviour that is very 
likely for a pious Jew (just as it is for a Christian in a comparable situation) 
is to pray that God spare him. However, the Nazis (at least in the example 
discussed here) deliberately and perversely always sent a fixed number of 
forced labourers death, so that God’s answer to one person’s prayer would 
have meant another person’s death. Hearing a fellow inmate’s prayer of 
thanksgiving after such a selection, Primo Levi, an Auschwitz-survivor, 
describes his thoughts:
Silence slowly prevails and then, from my bunk on the top row, I  see 
and hear old Kuhn praying aloud, with his beret on his head, swaying 
backwards and forwards violently. Kuhn is thanking God because he has 
not been chosen.
Kuhn is out of his senses. Does he not see Beppo the Greek in the 
bunk next to him, Beppo who is twenty years old and is going to the 
gas-chamber the day after tomorrow and knows it and lies there looking 
fixedly at the light without saying anything and without even thinking 
anymore? Can Kuhn fail to realize that next time it will be his turn? Does 
Kuhn not understand that what happened today is an  abomination, 
which no propitiatory prayer, no pardon, no expiation by the guilty, 
which nothing at all in the power of man can ever clean again?
If I was God, I would spit at Kuhn’s prayer. (Levi 1960: 151)
Comparing Levi’s criticism with the criteriology developed above, 
one could say that Kuhn’s prayer of thanks violates at least two of the 
abovementioned criteria. Therefore his prayer cannot be regarded 
as legitimation for a  theology after Auschwitz. I  do not want to be 
misunderstood here. It would be patronising in the extreme to say how 
a person facing death must pray, and I am in no position to do so. But one 
needs to consider Metz’s frequently invoked dictum that after Auschwitz 
we may only speak of and to God because the inmates at Auschwitz 
prayed. And faced with Metz’s dictum, we must also consider which 
forms of prayer and confession can, faced with these horrors, carry the 
burden of legitimation and which can definitely not.
We have seen two reasons why Kuhn’s prayer seems unable to carry 
this burden. First, it neglects the suffering of the other person. Kuhn does 
not take into account that he has been saved only because Beppo will die. 
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In this case, God’s saving intervention is impossible: one cannot be saved 
without the other being killed. With God loving every person equally, he 
will never overrule creaturely autonomy for the sake of exchanging one 
person’s life for another person.
It would be a different story if an  inmate prayed that God free the 
Nazis from their logic of death and destruction and release all prisoners. 
If we grant that human beings have free will then, as we have argued 
above, we must realize that God will not fulfil this prayer by manipulating 
the Nazis’ minds. He will instead try to motivate him with love to 
abandon his criminal behaviour. If the Nazi closes his mind to God’s 
pleading, however, Kuhn cannot be helped. There are thus no grounds to 
thank God for having been spared. As a result of the criminal madness 
of the Nazis, in the situation depicted above God accordingly has no 
direct possibility of intervening to change Kuhn’s fate. At the same time, 
Levi expressly states that it is impossible for human beings to make this 
catastrophe right again. Therefore, he does not criticise to expect the 
final and eschatological implementation of God’s goodness and justice 
in eschatological unrest.
At the end of the same book about his experiences in Auschwitz, 
Primo Levi mentions another example of speech about God’s action in 
Auschwitz. At the time this incident happened, Levi took it to involve 
God’s action, rejecting this interpretation only when he later lost his 
faith in God. In it, at the end of his shocking descriptions of everyday 
life in Auschwitz, he describes an Allied air raid on the concentration 
camp which SS officers had already abandoned, reporting that the wind 
prevented the still inhabited barracks from being burned. After all the 
horrors he experienced, when recalling this event he does not dare to 
explain it in terms of God’s action. But nevertheless he acknowledges: 
‘But without doubt in that hour the memory of biblical salvations in 
times of extreme adversity passed like a  wind through all our minds.’ 
(Levi 1960: 187)
Even if Levi, due to losing his faith, does not want prayers of thanks 
to be offered in this situation, they can, in fact, be used as a basis for 
discussion about talk of God’s action in Auschwitz. So long as this speech 
does not paper over the ungodly horrors of Auschwitz, and so long as 
it does not ignore the suffering that continues in spite of alleged divine 
action, the above criteria for theodicy-sensitive speech about divine 
action would probably be met. At the same time and in contrast to the 
example of Kuhn’s prayer, no manipulation of human freedom of will 
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would be required. Influencing the wind could rather occur within the 
randomness of natural law and therefore remain hidden to science.
Action in the randomness of the laws of nature thus allows for 
God to offer some form of limited help amidst such horrors. It cannot, 
however, assuage matters altogether. A third example reports how, after 
an  extermination campaign in the gas chambers of crematorium I  in 
Auschwitz, a  sixteen year old girl is found still living under the dead 
bodies. The physician reporting on this incident remarks that nothing 
like this had never happened before and could only be explained by 
a whole series of fortunate events.
This incident interrupts the usual mania of extermination and 
powerfully reminds those involved in the ‘Sonderkommando’ of what 
they are actually doing. With the members of the ‘Sonderkommando’ still 
thinking what to do now, ‘Oberscharführer’ Mußfeld, the SS supervisor, 
discovers the girl. Mußfeld’s job is to manage crematorium I and those 
who daily murder small groups of inmates. The physician in charge has 
a  good relationship with him and implores him to spare the girl. He 
suggests that the girl might be secretly integrated into a group of women 
engaged in road building.
In this situation, Mußfeld is confronted with the possibility of ceasing 
his murderous behaviour at least once. This singular incident even forces 
him to face up to his criminal behaviour altogether. He must and can 
choose, and does not have the excuse that he has no choice.
For me, everything said above, seems to point toward understanding 
this situation as God’s calling Mußfeld, trying (without force) to move 
the murderer and so win his freedom. He does not use force to change 
the SS man but powerfully tries to win him over. But his call remains 
unheeded. Mußfeld fears that the girl ‘in her naivety’ will talk of her 
rescue and cause difficulties for him. His fears deafen him to God’s call 
and he resumes his murderous mania. Yet his courage to kill the girl has 
vanished, maybe because he feels that in her the face of God has become 
so close to him. So he recruits a colleague to commit the murder and 
continues to function in the killing machinery of the camp.
Many such examples can be found in which perpetrators had choices 
to stop but did not. For me, they seem to make it possible, even when 
faced with Auschwitz, to confess God as someone trying to win over 
human beings even in the deepest misery and as someone trying to free 
them from their barbaric mania of extermination. But he does not force 
people. He does not prevent the gas from pouring out by intervening in 
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the natural laws, but tries to stop the murderous action by confronting 
the murderers with the face of the girl. If, therefore, the SS men refuse to 
be freed, then even God’s ability to rescue is thwarted.
However, we are not only baffled with the question whether God’s 
mercy on the murderers goes too far. We can also ask why he seems 
to remain silent when people cry for help. In this respect, Awraham S., 
an Auschwitz-survivor, reports:
There was a Hungarian rabbi, and we came back from the square, fewer 
children, far fewer. Then he said that we should start the prayer. And 
suddenly he looked up at the sky and half in Yiddish, half in German, he 
said: ‘My dear God, if you exist, if you are there, give a sign! Now is the 
time! Have you seen what they have done to our children? Is a God there 
in heaven? Then answer! Do something!
No one knows whether the rabbi was given an answer. In any case, he 
did not receive the sign he wanted, which was that children be saved. The 
author of this collection of testimonies therefore remarks:
Of an  answer nothing is reported. Who could look these children in 
the face, blue from the gas and with their fingernails torn open from 
suffocation, and say to them: your death makes sense. (Fruchtmann 
1982: 16)
Yet we must take care here. With regard to the current discussions of 
the question of theodicy this problem can be solved without making the 
perverse claim that sense can be made of the death of innocent children: 
we can maintain the claim that God is active even in Auschwitz. With 
regard to the sign demanded by the rabbi, we must only note that such 
a sign could not have consisted in stopping the Nazis against their will. 
For this is impossible if God is conceived as someone who is indeed 
willing to forgive unconditionally and who wants to use only love to win 
people’s freedom. Whether the rabbi was given an answer is left open by 
the witness whom Fruchtmann quotes and cannot be speculated upon. 
Signs on one’s own journey cannot be recognized from the outside.
What should be clear by now, however, is that neither the examples 
we have discussed, nor the need to allow for the possibility of signs 
unnoticed by others, allows us to maintain belief in providence in its 
traditional form. We must agree with Leo B., another survivor:
There is no providence. And if providence exists, and if God exists, then 
he is not a good God, he is a God of destruction, a God of vengeance, no 
good God!
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For, I saw people dying in Auschwitz, children dying in Auschwitz, who 
were good, who had done nothing yet, and who did not even have the 
opportunity of doing anything. I knew people who were the best people 
one can ever imagine and who perished – who were beaten to death or 
were killed or starved, starved without anyone – without a godly hand – 
ever doing anything!
In light of the unfortunate situation that God time and again does not 
intervene to save, and in light of our repeatedly frustrated prayers, we 
are forced to diverge from the traditional belief in providence. Speaking 
of God must leave room for protest, and the belief in some form of 
providence can only be developed if it does not lead us to reconcile 
ourselves with what is happening.
However, it seems to me that the suggestions developed here can, even 
in light of the testimonies from Auschwitz, allow for theodicy-sensitive 
talk of God’s action in history. People’s agony – and their hope to be saved 
from it – should forbid an abandonment of the eschatological unrest and 
the hope in God’s powerful presence by eliminating the possibility to 
speak of a special divine action in the world.
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